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I  am  most  grateful  to  you  Mr.  Chairman  and  to  the 
Southern Agribusiness  Forum  for  giving me  this opportunity 
of  saying  a  few  words  to  you  on  such  an  important  topic  -
one with implications not only  for  European  far~ers but 
also for American  agriculture and  for  American  agribusiness. 
I  propose  spending  the half hour alloted to  me  this 
morning  saying  something  about  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy  - where it has  got  to  and  the  course plotted  for 
its future. 
As  most  of you will  know,  the  European  Communi  t~' 
has  operated its own  farm  policy  - the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy or  CAP  - for  the last  20  years  or  so,  and  I  i~agine 
that you will also appreciate its great  importance  not 
only to our  3  million  farmers  and  their families  but also 
to all  270  million Europeans  living in our  10  Member  States. 
The  objectives of  the  CAP  - set out in the  Treaty of 
Rome  - can  be  summarised  as  follm·Js 
- to  increase productivity  ; 
to  give  the  farmer  a  fair standard of  living 
- to  assure  the  supply of  sufficient  food  at 
reasonable  prices,  and 
- to  stabilise markets. 
. I ... Goals which  are not very different - I  would  have  thought 
from  US  Farm policy  ,  but  - I  get the  impression  - that 
here 
there is perhaps  less  emphasis/on stability of prices 
and  security of supply. 
Very  broadly,  these objectives  have  been  achieved 
by  fixing  common  prices  for  the  major part of our  farm 
production.  But  here,  let me  emphasise  that the  CAP 
be 
should not  looked at in  a  purely economic  context but 
against  a  social,  political,  cultural and  environmental 
background  as well.  We  believe that the well-being of 
agriculture is essential to  the  fabric  of rural life. 
Let  us  now  look briefly at what  the effects of 
achieving these objectives  have  been  - both  inside  and 
outside the  Community. 
We  are  frequently  accused  by  our critics of  spending 
limitless  sums  of money  to  encourage  our  farmers  to 
produce  surpluses which  are  then off-loaded onto  world 
markets.  But let us  examine  the  facts. 
First.  As  a  result of  the  support we  give  our 
farmers,  our wheat  production,  for  example,  has  increased 
by  29%  over  the  last decade  - slightly more  than  the 
world  average of  27%.  The  increase here  in  the  US  has 
been  73%  and  a  lot of that in soft wheat  grown  largely here 
. I ... 
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in the Eastern half of  the  US.  This  increase is  2  1/2  times 
the world  average.  I  say this in no  accusatory sense,  but 
in an  attempt to set the  record straight.  But,  at the 
same  time,  I  cannot resist commenting  that an  increase 
of this magnitude  and particularly in soft wheat  - is 
bound  to  have  had  some  destabilising effect on  the world 
wheat  market. 
Furthermore,  the  increase in  Community  production  has 
been  achieved  on  an  acreage  that has  remained  virtually 
unchanged  for  the last ten  to  fifteen years. 
Second.  Our  total  farm  spending on  all agricultural 
products  at about  13.5  bio  $  in  1983,  compared  with 
around  20  bio  $  here  - PIK  excluded  - represen~ed less 
than  1/2 of  one  per cent of  the  Communi tj''  s  GDP. 
As  to  the  impact  of  the  CAP  on  world  markets, 
let me  start by  referring to  so@ething  which  I  hear 
with  increasing  frequency  - "the  CAP  is  fine  so  long 
as it confines  itself to  do~estic,  i~ternal policies 
but not  so  good  when  you  export  your  surplus  by  means 
of unfair export  subsidies". 
Just three  general  points 
I 
. I  ••. First,  we  are not the only producers  in the world 
that export products which  are surplus  to internal re-
quirements.  Two  thirds of  US  wheat,  for example,  is 
surplus  to requirements  and  has  to  find  buyers  on  the 
world market.  In  addition,  50  per cent of your  cotton 
and  40  per cent of your  soyabeans  are bought  by  customers 
overseas.  The  last two  - cotton and  soyabeans  - are,  of 
course,  of great interest to you here  in the  South  and 
East.  But  the  Community  grows  very little of either and 
imports  about  10  to  11  mio  t  of  the latter. 
Second,  International trading rules  to which  both 
the  US  and  the  EC  are signatories,  specifically permit 
the  use of export subsidies,  provided  they are not  used 
to  gain  more  than  an  equitable share of  the market. 
We  maintain,  and  trade statistics support our  view,  that 
we  have  kept  to these rules. 
And  last,  but of signal  importance,  the  EC  is  the 
American  farmers'  best customer  taking  about  1/3 of 
4. 
US  farm  exports  and  running  a  massive deficit with vou  on  our 
transatlantic agricultural trade. 
It seems  to  me  that where  the  US  has  lost markets  -
the major  factors  have  been  the  strength of the  US  dollar 
brought  about  primarily  by  a  massive  budget deficit - a 
point of view  now  subscribed to  by  USDA  in one  of their 
more  recent publicatious  -~and,  of course,  a  desperate 
. I ... shortage of  funds  particularly in developing countries. 
This,  of course,  is not  a  very  original diagnosis 
but is perhaps  worth  repeating  once  again. 
This  brief review of past events  should  not  be 
taken  to  imply that everything is fine  on  the other 
side of the Atlantic  and  that we  have  no  problems  whatso-
ever  in the  Cormnuni ty.  Those  of  you  \vho  follow  develop-
ments  in the Community,  even at the most  superficial 
level,  will  be  well  aware  of  the  serious  problems  \Je 
currently face.  On  the agriculture  front,  \ve  are  both 
of  us  - US  and  EC  together  - basically  faced  with  the 
same  problem  :  that of  producing  larger quantities  than 
markets  can  absorb  which,  of  course,  is not  the  same  as 
saying that there is  too  much  food  in  the  worl~. 
Whilst  I  strongly believe  that the  CAP  is one  of  the 
major  achievements  of  the  European  Community,  it must  -
like any  other in?titution or  policy,  if it is  to  survive, 
and  survive it will  - adapt  itself to  changing conditions. 
In  the  Community,  technical  advances  and  productivity 
gains  have  Meant  that output  has  risen more  rapidly 
than  consumption. 
Increases  in  the  volume  of agricultural production 
5. 
have  averaged  between  l  l/2  and  2%  a  year whilst  consumption 
has  only  risen by  about  l/2%. 
. I . .. At  the  same  time,  we  are running very  low on  cash  -
whether  farm expenditure represents  less  than  one half 
of one  per cent or not. 
From  1974  to 1979,  expenditure on  supporting agricul-
tural markets  grew at 23%  per year  - almost  twice  the 
rate of growth  in our revenue.  For  the next  two  or 
three years  - 1980  to 1982  - expenditure  remained 
fairly stable,  largely because prices  remained relatively 
high on world markets.  But  since  then  expenditure has 
increased sharply  (once  again,  as it has  here),  and 
an  increase of about  30%  is estimated for  1983. 
Unlike  most  national  governments  - our  Community 
constitution forbids  us  to run  a  budget deficit.  So, 
for  the  first time  we  are  running very close  indeed to 
our  financial  limits. 
There  is very little spare left.  This  chilling 
fact  coupled with that of production outpacing consumption 
is the  background  against which  the  Commission  has  pro-
posed  an  essential and  very  tough  double barrelwbattery 
of measures  for  the rationalisation of our agriculture. 
The  first was  announced  in July and  concentrated  on  a  broad 
adapt~tion of our  farm  policy  - the  second,  revealed only 
two  weeks  ago,  makes  specific proposals  as  regards  prices 
for  individual  crops. 
. I . .. 
6. The  main  thrust of the  Commission's  proposals  is  : 
to adapt our agricultural policy to meet  the  changed 
conditions of  the mid  80's 
- to discourage  surplus  farn production 
- to limit Community  spending  on  farm  support. 
Time  does  not allow me  to describe  in  any  detail 
the  full  panoply of measures  which will hit  8  million 
European  farmers  and their families  and  which will 
demand  substantial sacrifices  from  them. 
The  European  farmers'  organisation  - COPA  - said re-
cently that the proposed measures  "would  have  extremely 
serious repercussions  on  all sectors of agricultural 
production  and  would  lead  to  a  further  substantial fall 
in  farmers  incomes". 
But  briefly,  the measures  envisaged  are  : 
l  production quotas  with  severe penalties  for 
farmers  who  exceed  them  - a  75%  levy  in  the 
case of dairy  farmers,  for  example  ; 
ii  extension of  guarantee  thresholds  (guarantee 
thresholds  put  a  strict ceiling on  the  amount 
of  a  given  crop  a  farmer  may  produce without 
him  having  to contribute  to  the  cost of dis-
posing of  the  surplus) 
. I ... 
7. iii  a  tough price policy for  farm  products  which 
will entail_reductions in  some  cases  and  an 
intensification of our efforts to narrow the 
gap  between  our prices and  those of our  com-
petitors  ;  - I  \'lill return to these  two  aspects 
in  a  moment ••• 
iv  prices  for  some  surplus  commodities  to be 
fixed  for more  than  one  marketing year 
v  reduced  intervention or  support buying 
vi  - and,  the  discontinuation of  a  number  of production 
aids  and  premiums. 
o. 
This  brings  me  to  the  external aspects  of  the  package. 
Since our  own  farmers  are being  asked  to  make  considerable 
sacrifices  and  to limit their production,  the  Commission 
feels  that it is not  unreasonable  to  review  the  treatment 
of  competing  impo~ts provided that this is done  strictly 
in accordance with international trading rules. 
As  I  said earlier,  we  are aiming  to  narrm1  the  gap 
between our  grain prices  and  those of  our competitors. 
Such  a  move  will,  in the  long run,  have  the  effect of 
making  grain substitutes much  less attractive.  But 
until that time  and whilst we  are inplementing  a  s·::::-ict 
guarantee  threshold  and  requiring our grain producers 
to limit their own  production,  it is absolutely essential 
. I ... to have  some  effective stabilisation of the  imports of 
grain substitutes.  Such stabilisation should also help 
to reduce  surpluses  in the  ~ivestock sector  - particularly 
in milk. 
Our  aim of stabilising imports  of substitutes is not 
a  fiendish  European  plot  aimed  specifically at the resi-
dues  of the  US  corn processing industry.  Substitutes 
are  imported  into the  EC  from  a  wide  range  of  sources 
and  arrangements  have  already been  concluded  for  manioc 
and  for  bran  coming  from  South East  Asia  and  elsewhere. 
It is  now  proposed  to stabilise the  imports  of other 
major  substitutes  - corn gluten  feed,  for  example  -
a  residue,  to  a  large extent,  from  the  corn  sweetener 
industry which,  incidentally,  has  been  able  to  take 
advantage  of  US  support arrangements  for  sugar . 
Imports  of  cgf  have  soared  from  under  700.000  tons 
to  3  million  tons· since  1974. 
However,  and  I  must  stress this,  what  is being 
proposed is not hasty unilateral action,  not  a  banning 
of corn gluten  imports  nor  even  a  reduction  in  imports, 
as  one  might  gather  from  the  howls  of protest,  but  a 
calm and  reasoned  negotiation  aimed at a  stabilisation 
of imports  and  this only after carrying out  the  proce-
dures  laid down  in the  GATT. 
. I ... 
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Two  final observations  about this particular proposal. 
It does  not  seem  to  me  unreasonable  to  ask  for cooperation 
from other countries  in limiting our  imports  of subsitutes 
since adaptation of the  CAP  - with the  cutbacks  envisaged  -
is in their interest since it should  lead to  a  better 
balance  on world markets  - something the  US  has  been  pressing 
us  to  do  for years. 
And,  furthermore,  it seems  to  me  that if we  can 
successfully stabilise our  imports of grain subsitutes, 
then  the  amount of European wheat which  would  be  forced 
onto  world markets  because it had  been  displaced  by  sub-
stitutes in animal  feeding,  would  be  reduced.  A  factor 
which  should not be without interest to  a  number  of 
those  represented here  today. 
The  second measure  which  has  caused concern here  in 
the United  States  and  nowhere  nm:e  so  than in Hr.  Weems 
association,  is the  proposed  consumption  tax on oils 
and  fats. 
Let  me  try to  calm these  fears. 
First,  the tax would  be  non-discriminatory  and 
applied  to all oils and  fats,  excluding butter,  whether 
produced  locally or  imported.  Imports  would  be  treated 
no  differently  from  domestic  products.  This  squares 
fully with  international trading rules. 
. I . .. Second,  it is extremely doubtful whether  the tax 
would  have  any measurable effect on  the quantities of 
oil  seeds  and  beans  ir:tported  because: 
(a)  the  low rate of  tax proposed  is unlikely 
to alter consumption patterns of oil and  margarine: 
(b)  all other vegetable oils,  including olive 
oil, would  be  taxed at the  same  flat rate which  would 
have  a  proportionally greater effect on  lower  priced 
l.argel.y 
oils - such  as  rapeseed oil produced/from Comounity 
grown  seed: 
(c)  soya  beans  and  meal  are  imported primarily 
for  animal  feed  and  not  for oil production. 
Third,  and  most  important,  it is no  part of this 
proposal  to subject  3  to  4  bio  $  \vorth  imports  of  soya 
bean or  soya meal  or any other oil seed  to  any  restriction, 
tax or  levy. 
Let  us  now  turn to  the detailed price proposals 
made  a  fortnight  ago  but which  have  to  be  seen  in the 
frame\mrk  of the earlier proposal made  last July. 
We  have  explained to the  10  national  governments  that 
what  is required  from  them is  a  global decision before 
31  narch on  both elements.  There  can  be  no  picking and 
choosing  from  the list as  one  might  do  from  an  a  la carte 
menu.  Ministers  can  no  longer put off taking difficult 
decisions. 
't·lhat  has  been  proposed  in reality is  a  virtual 
price  freeze,  but with variations  - a  few  prices are 
to  be  increased,  some  frozen-and  some  reduced. 
. I ... 
11. Our  price proposals  have  been  adapted  to  the different 
market situations of different products. 
For cereals,  milk,  wine  and  tomatoes,  where 
the market  situation calls for  a  particularly restrictive 
pricing policy,  it is proposed  that prices  for  next year 
are  frozen at their present level  ; 
For  colzaand  rapeseed,  where  the guarantee 
thresholds  I  mentioned earlier have  been exceeded  and 
for certain varieties of  tobacco,  price reductions are 
proposed  ; 
For  sugar,  durum,  wheat,  sunflower  seed,  beef 
and  some  other products marginal  increases  have  been 
proposed. 
The  average  effect of these measures  overall will 
be  to  increase prices  by  0.8%  in Ecu  terms.  But  when 
expressed  in national currencies,  which after all is 
what our  farmers  are paid in,  the result will  be  an 
average  frop  of  l/2%. 
It is abundantly clear that  some  parts of this 
package will be difficult for  the agricultural  com-
munity to accept,  particularly after an  average  decline 
in  EC  farm  incomes  of about  6%  last year.  But it has 
to be  pointed out that the  CAP  has  helped to protect 
our  farmers  from  the worst effects of  the  economic 
crisis.  Farm  incomes  in  some  other parts of the world 
declined more  steeply  last year. 
. I ... 
12. It is also abundantly clear that the market situation 
for  many  of our  farm  products is extremely difficult and 
in milk particularly production has  gone  far  beyond  what 
the market  can handle.  Public authorities cannot  be 
expected to  take  charge of all these  products  for  which 
there is no  market.  The  CAP  cannot continue  on  such  a 
basis  - one  which  is neither economically  sound  nor 
financially acceptable. 
However,  this is not to  say that these  proposals 
for  European  agriculture are merely  a  list of  price 
savings  to  the benefit of our  hard  pressed  budget  and 
at the  expense  of  the  farm  community.  They  have  to  be 
seen  as  part of  a  coherent,  overall policy  for  the  de-
velopment  not  the  dismantling of  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy. 
Neither  should  they  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  shuffle 
off our  problems  on  to  our  friends  and  allies.  They  are 
a  serious  and  honest effort to  adapt our  farm  policy to 
meet  the vastly changed  conditions  of  the  mid  80's. 
As  a  result,  the  CAP  will  be  given  the opportunity to 
continue to ensure  food  supply  and  price stability,  to 
give our  farmers  a  reasonable,  but not  excessive,  return 
and  yet permit  us  to  play  a  positive,  cooperative  and 
responsible  role  in the  world  trade. 
*  *  * 
DR/sbh 